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Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context 
Abstract 
The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global 
scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past 
two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically 
organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease 
agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global 
financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political 
economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new 
regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a 
“delegative” democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems 
and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the 
newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints 
and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial 
reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized 
financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs’ 
independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue. 
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Introduction 
Internationally, the history of corporate accounting and auditing is replete with failures and 
scandals, followed by waves of regulation (e.g. Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Zeff, 2003). In the past 
two decades of advancing globalization, reforms in the accounting domain have taken place within 
what Wade (2007a) calls the Standards–Surveillance–Compliance (SSC) doctrine, a regulatory 
framework of globally-integrated financial markets that aims to provide stability in the marketplace 
(Βüthe & Mattli, 2011; Davies & Green, 2008; Wade, 2007a, 2007b). This new dogma entails the 
use of comprehensive and universal standards, as well as codes of good practice, whose application 
would be overseen and enforced by a gamut of regulatory institutions and agencies – official or 
unofficial, national or global (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009). 
A key element of the emerging international financial reporting infrastructure is the introduction of 
systems of oversight for accounting and audit practice, independent of the profession, which 
appears to signal an end to the tradition of self-regulation. Accounting and auditing oversight 
boards (OBs) serve as a basic mechanism for tackling perennial problems in corporate financial 
reporting and auditing, within the broader complex and hierarchical global regulatory system 
(Arnold, 2012; Humphrey et al., 2009; Wade, 2007a). OBs emerged in the US under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (US Congress, 2002), in the EU under the (new) Eighth Directive (European 
Commission, 2006), and in other countries (Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Their establishment rests on 
the assumption that they can operate efficiently and effectively to ease agency problems, improve 
the quality of financial reporting, and help to restore the trust of investors and the public (European 
Commission, 2001a, 2006, 2010; US Congress, 2002, 2010). 
The system of oversight for accounting and auditing is domestically organized and embedded 
within distinctively diverse local political, economic, legal, and cultural contexts (e.g. Kaufmann, 
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2013). O’Donnell (1994) argues that, for historical and socio-political reasons, 
some countries consistently exhibit a marked weakness in introducing social and economic reforms 
and in building strong and functional institutions of horizontal accountability. These countries, 
termed by O’Donnell as “delegative” democracies, are characterized by a highly clientelistic 
political system and state ineffectiveness, standing in contrast to other countries that have shown a 
history of successful reforms and strong institutionalization. Thus, the effectiveness of the operation 
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of OBs at a domestic level warrants in-depth empirical evaluation (Arnold, 2012; Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011), given their importance for the stability of the global financial system (Wade, 
2007a, 2007b) and the variability of local institutional backdrops (Dyson & Goetz, 2003; 
O’Donnell, 1994). 
In this article, we adopt an institutional approach located within the broader political economy 
framework of global capitalism (Arnold, 2009b, 2012; Wade, 2007a, 2007b; see also Chapman, 
Cooper & Miller, 2009) to examine the creation and operation of an OB in a local European setting. 
We focus on O’Donnell’s (1994) conceptualization of delegative democracy and supplement our 
framework with literature on Europeanization, which indicates that reform (in)capacity problems 
and weak institutionalization occur even within the EU and the euro area (Dyson & Goetz, 2003; 
Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008). We place emphasis on the interaction between global 
structural elements, institutions, influences and pressures (namely, the unfolding of the SSC 
project), and on local socio-political characteristics that may condition the establishment and 
effective operation of OBs at the local (state) level. Our focus is Greece, which offers a clear 
vantage point for examining the issue at hand for two main reasons. First, the country is known for 
its clientelistic political system and well-documented reform (in)capacity problems (e.g. 
Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008). Second, Greece has been in a deep, multifaceted crisis since 
2008 (OECD, 2011a, 2011b), illustrating the importance of each nation to the stability of the new, 
complex, and interdependent international financial system (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
With a wealth of empirical material (written evidence and interview data), our national case study 
illustrates the difficulties and limitations in transplanting Anglo-American (Arnold, 2012) reforms 
to a diverse socio-political local context. Our study shows that the political practices of clientelism 
and party patronage, as well as bureaucratic control by the government and a widespread mentality 
of inertia within the broader state apparatus, have affected ELTE1, the Greek OB, since its inception 
in 2003. As a result, ELTE has remained essentially dormant. In this study, we show that ELTE has 
failed to become a significant player in Greek accounting and audit practices and demonstrate that 
improvements are urgently needed in the quality of Greek financial reporting and auditing 
                                                 
1 The full Greek name of ELTE is Επιτροπή Λογιστικής Τυποποίησης και Ελέγχων – ΕΛΤΕ (Epitropi Logistikis 
Typopoisis kai Elegchon – ELTE), which translates as the Accounting and Auditing Committee). 
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(Caramanis & Papadakis, 2008; Christensen Hail, & Leuz, 2013; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003; 
Osma & Pope, 2011). 
This article extends prior work on the establishment of the Greek OB (Blavoukos, Caramanis & 
Dedoulis, 2013) and contributes to emerging international academic literature on accounting and 
auditing oversight (e.g. Malsch & Gendron, 2011) on several fronts. First, our paper employs 
O’Donnell’s theoretical conception of delegative democracies within a broader political economy 
framework to create the theoretical backdrop for investigating how local socio-political constraints 
condition the establishment and operation of an imported institution – a subject that is currently 
high on the global agenda. In particular, we show that the Greek OB has been stymied since 
inception by pre-existing local structures and remains essentially a dormant institution, providing no 
concrete benefits to financial reporting quality. Second, whereas the current system of oversight 
puts emphasis on ensuring the independence of OBs from the auditing profession, we illustrate that 
independence from government is an equally important but essentially neglected issue. Specifically, 
we argue that, while existing arrangements may have saved the oversight system from the Scylla of 
professional control, they have sailed too close to the Charybdis of state meddling. 
Thus, our study draws attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing integration of the 
interdependent global financial system and the fragmented organization of accounting and auditing 
oversight on a domestic (national) level. This mismatch raises the question of the effectiveness of 
local OBs, given the diversity of the domestic socio-political contexts within which they emerge 
and the rather elementary level of current international or regional (e.g. EU) coordination (Davies & 
Green, 2008, pp. 89–91; Humphrey et al., 2009). 
Our study is of relevance to several other countries that exhibit, albeit to varying degrees, a tradition 
of party patronage, clientelism, institutional weaknesses and state ineffectiveness. The findings have 
implications for various actors and stakeholders in financial reporting. For example, global 
regulators should realize that independence from the profession, while simultaneously ignoring 
local institutional impediments, by no means guarantees the operation of effective national OBs 
across the globe. Furthermore, in the absence of effective oversight, particularly amid a severe 
financial crisis, there is a real risk that the quality of auditing will fall and audit fees will plunge, 
conditions that may bring about a major legitimation crisis for the profession. 
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The rest of the article is structured as follows: in the next section, we discuss the emergence of 
accounting and auditing OBs since the early 2000s as a means for regulating globalized capitalism, 
with particular emphasis on institutional aspects, and we present the research methods employed. 
We then outline the international and local institutional settings to demonstrate the environment 
from which the Greek OB emerged. Next, we present the debate in the Greek Parliament to 
illuminate prevailing perceptions of independence and clientelism, and to sketch the context in 
which the new OB was eventually submitted to government control. We then demonstrate the 
inertia of ELTE through an evaluation of its performance since inception (2003–2013). Concluding 
remarks and implications appear in the last section. 
The political economy of OB establishment: an institutional approach 
As accounting scholars have observed, the internationalization of accounting and auditing practices 
is not a recent phenomenon (e.g. Hopwood, 2000; Power, 2009). Rather, long historical processes 
have been at work for centuries, as a result of the expansion of a universalistic commercial culture. 
Power (2009, p. 331) in particular highlights the need to understand “the history and institutional 
shape of a changing structural coupling between world-level accounting elements and the 
preoccupation of state agencies” and calls for a shift of emphasis from the nation-state to the “world 
system of accounting”. Arnold (2009a, 2009b, 2012) recognizes Power’s (2009) position as a useful 
starting point and argues for an institutional perspective, informed by the political economy of the 
contemporary inter-state system, to examine the role of accounting in the global economic system. 
Such a perspective draws attention to the key role of (historically changing) hegemonic states (still 
the US at the current historical juncture), conflicting interests, and power relations in the 
governance of global capitalism. 
At the turn of the 21st century, a new international financial architecture was under development to 
provide urgently-needed stability to a global financial system characterized by recurring crises, the 
rise of finance capital and inequality among states regarding the power to influence the shaping of 
emerging regulatory apparatuses (Arnold, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Humphrey et al., 2009; Wade, 
2007a, 2007b). This new architecture was sponsored by the G7 (G20 since the crisis of the late 
2000s; see Humphrey et al., 2009, p. 812) and other significant actors in international financial 
systems. It provided for an upgraded role of various international organizations (e.g. International 
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Monetary Fund) and the application of a series of global standards and codes of good practice in the 
management of the global financial system (Wade, 2007a, 2007b). These standards of good practice 
(the SSC system) cover macroeconomic policy and data transparency, institutional and market 
infrastructures (including international accounting as well as auditing standards), and financial 
regulation and supervision (Arnold, 2012, p. 367). The key idea was that adherence to these 
standards of practice and increased transparency would improve the quality of financial reporting 
and access to finance, thus further inducing (in a virtuous circle) the observance of these standards 
(Humphrey et al., 2009). 
However, Wade (2007a, 2007b) argues that this new financial architecture promotes the interests of 
Anglo-American style capitalism and reflects the increasing importance of the finance industry in 
global economic activity. Furthermore, Arnold (2012) contends that reformers have shown 
eagerness in rapidly promoting the reforms, regardless of the ability of countries to effectively 
introduce and assimilate them. Other options, such as slowing down the pace of reforms to give 
states some breathing space (Arnold, 2012) or setting up truly international regulators to match the 
global nature of the financial integration (Eatwell & Taylor, 2000), were rejected at the time. 
OBs within the SSC system 
A key component of the new regime has been accounting and auditing OBs, which are meant to 
operate at the state level and to occupy a pivotal role in restoring confidence in financial reporting. 
OBs, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are promoted as a uniform solution to the need for 
material improvements in the effectiveness of global financial market regulation (Arnold, 2012; 
Βüthe & Mattli, 2011; Davis & Green, 2008). 
OBs, local or transnational, are complex, multifaceted units of analysis, with important and diverse 
characteristics. They are established as formal political institutions, operating at the interface 
between the world of economy and the world of politics (e.g. Βüthe & Mattli, 2011; Davies & 
Green, 2008). As actors within the political arena, OBs are part of the wider decision-making 
system, assumed to produce and/or effect mandatory rules within a given territory (not necessarily 
confined to the borders of a particular jurisdiction/state) and for a particular domain (e.g. 
accounting). 
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The establishment of accounting and auditing OBs within the SSC context is considered a means to 
secure an adequate level of quality in financial reporting to facilitate the operation of globalized 
financial markets (Humphrey et al., 2009; Wade, 2007a, 2007b). In this sense, the establishment of 
OBs in the 2000s can be understood as a manifestation of the “accounting internationalization” 
process, which has a long history (Hopwood, 2000; Power, 2009). However, as Power (2009) notes, 
accounting scholars have long voiced caution or skepticism about the feasibility of eradicating local 
“constraints” to the internationalization of accounting practice and regulation, as these constraints 
are culturally and institutionally embedded and exhibit remarkable resilience (e.g. Bromwich & 
Hopwood, 1983; Hopwood, 2000, 2009; Puxty et al., 1987). 
Other scholars have challenged the suitability of externally-induced change, modeled on the Anglo-
American tradition, because it disregards local factors crucial for the project’s success (Arnold, 
2012; Wade, 2007a, 2007b). In particular, scholars have questioned the feasibility of pursuing the 
stability of a global, complex and interdependent financial system through the operation of domestic 
OBs across the globe. At the same time, local needs for reform are ignored, leaving the imbalances 
and inequalities among states in the global economic system neglected. 
Wade (2007b) suggests that the effectiveness of the system of global oversight should not be taken 
for granted, and he captures the need for a thorough investigation of OBs in practice thus: 
At first glance, transparency, standards and surveillance are as desirable as motherhood 
and apple pie. To go beyond the first glance we have to ask whether national regulatory 
authorities have complied with the standards, and whether their compliance makes a 
difference to the behavior of private market participants (p. 80). 
To examine OBs at the local level more closely, we turn to the literature on politico-economic 
reforms and institution building. O’Donnell (1994) recognizes strong institutions, such as OBs, as 
key factors for the smooth functioning of the political and economic process and he maintains that 
the effectiveness of such institutions is contingent on the wider socio-political context (see also 
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Schmitter, 1974; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985). More specifically, 
O’Donnell (1994) suggests that, for various reasons, including long-term historical factors and the 
intensity of their socio-economic problems, some countries have failed to develop a state of 
consolidated, institutionalized democracy, or what he terms “representative democracy”. These 
countries, dubbed “delegative democracies”, in contrast to their representative counterparts, tend to 
have weak institutions (e.g. OBs), often due to intentional strategy. Such countries tend to lack or 
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have weak horizontal accountability mechanisms (i.e. a nexus of relatively autonomous institutions 
that operate as a system of checks and balances to the flow of power). In delegative democracies, 
institutions that make horizontal accountability operational in practice are often considered 
“unnecessary encumbrances … and strenuous efforts [are made] to hamper the development of such 
institutions” (ibid., pp. 61–62). 
Furthermore, the enforcement of a clear distinction between the public and the private interests of 
office-holders in delegative democracies is cursory, if not absent. In other words, in these countries, 
whoever wins the elections is in a sense “entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by 
the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office” (ibid., p. 
59). In addition, delegative democracies are typically omnipotent in introducing spectacular policy 
reform packages and in setting up various institutions that often imitate successful examples from 
advanced countries but are in fact highly impotent, or maybe indifferent, in effectively 
implementing those decisions in practice (ibid.). In short, delegative democracies tend to exhibit 
characteristics such as: low-quality public administration with limited independence from political 
pressure; low commitment to sound policy formulation and implementation; limited confidence in 
and abidance of the rules; weaknesses in contract enforcement, and regulatory capture by elites and 
private interests (O’Donnell, 1994; see also Kaufmann et al., 2013). 
One qualification is warranted with regard to O’Donnell’s (1994) ideal typology of democracies. 
Representative and delegative democracies should not be considered polar opposites; rather, they 
differ only in the degree, albeit often significant, to which they exhibit their particular 
characteristics, and it is not always easy to make a sharp distinction between them. 
Building strong institutions and effectively introducing material reforms in member states is critical 
for the EU, given the political objectives of economic and political integration (European 
Commission, 2001b). Yet the difficulties involved show remarkable resilience (e.g. Balkir, 
Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2013; Falkner & Treib, 2008; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005). EU 
reform initiatives are, in practice, imposed on states exhibiting distinctively diverse social, political 
and institutional backgrounds (e.g. Dyson & Goetz, 2003). Dyson and Goetz (2003) maintain that 
the peripheral, or less central, states in southern Europe (e.g. Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) exert 
considerably less influence than core countries on the formulation of EU policy. As they 
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convincingly argue, the Europeanization project is highly likely to be a mere “top-down” process 
for peripheral southern member states and may produce variable and contingent outcomes due to 
social, political and economic differences among  various member states. 
Studies have shown that the implementation of EU-inspired reforms by member states is often 
associated with significant gaps between the intended purposes and the actual effects of the 
Europeanization project (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008; Radaelli, 2003). In a sense, when 
change is imposed from above (Mouzelis, 1995), the complex, multifaceted and interdependent 
domestic system of economic and political power illustrates a form of social “homeostasis” (Simon, 
1962, p. 467). Reforms are internalized in such a way that the system essentially maintains its ex 
ante equilibrium. Material change is minimized, delayed, postponed and even averted (Mouzelis, 
1995; Pagoulatos, 2003). Blavoukos et al. (2013) examine aspects of the function of the Greek OB 
within the context of the Europeanization process – which, inter alia, involves the curtailment of a 
member state’s policy-making role and the disempowerment of domestic technocracy. The authors 
use Radaeli’s (2003) conceptual model to illustrate that domestic policy adaptation to EU-induced 
reforms is often shallow and a mere façade. 
Other prior literature in the field of politics has identified links between this reform gap and the 
particular features of the local political system. For example, in delegative democracies the 
operation of formal institutions is eroded by non-formalized but strongly-operative practices, such 
as clientelism (O’Donnell, 1994), which “cut across the divide between public and private” 
(Christiansen & Neuhold, 2012b, p. 1). The issue of clientelism, and more generally the existence of 
informal practices, is certainly not limited to delegative democracies (Christiansen & Neuhold, 
2012a). Key aspects of the process and outcomes of political and economic reform initiatives can be 
explained using the “party patronage” approach (Hopkin, 2006; Kopercky & Scherlis, 2008; 
Piattoni, 2001; Roniger, 2004). In broad terms, party patronage refers to the actions of political 
parties in power to put appointees in key positions (in the civil service as well as various 
commissions and regulatory bodies), so that government policies and objectives are best served (see 
Piattoni, 2001). Party patronage constitutes a critical organizational and governmental resource 
employed by political parties across Europe and elsewhere (Kopercky & Scherlis, 2008). 
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However, the scope of party appointments, as well as the rationale behind it, may vary significantly. 
In countries with well-established institutional traditions (representative democracies), party 
patronage may be narrow in scope and political appointments are usually limited to ministerial 
positions, only to secure the mere existence of party government (Kopercky & Scherlis, 2008, p. 
362). In contrast, in countries with weak institutionalization2, in addition to the control of top-
ranking positions, a large number of jobs are supplied as a clientelistic exchange for political 
support: “this type of patronage is primarily employed ... for more far-reaching clientelistic 
exchanges ... [W]hat matters, however, is that jobs are primarily utilized as a reward for party or 
factional allegiance, rather than for any other purposes” (Kopercky & Scherlis, 2008, p. 363; see 
also Hopkin, 2006). 
A clientelistic political system in delegative democracies means that institutions such as OBs, which 
in principle should be autonomous organizations, in practice lack independence from the state 
apparatus, which itself is a prisoner of political parties (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008; 
Lyrintzis, 2005, 1984; Papakostas, 2001). Party patronage in delegative democracies systematically 
undermines the operation of OBs as independent horizontal control mechanisms (O’Donnell, 1994). 
Lack of independence implies limited ability for an OB to express an objective opinion within its 
jurisdictional domain, to the extent that such an opinion could be interpreted as undesirable or 
disadvantageous for the government. In addition, institutions in delegative democracies run the risk 
of being caught in the cogs of clientelism, state indifference, ineffectiveness and red tape. These 
interrelated factors might even prevent an institution from dealing with basic organizational issues 
and developing into a functioning organization. 
In short, clientelism and other features of delegative democracies (e.g. poor government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law) limit the possibility of building strong, operative 
institutions of horizontal accountability, such as OBs, which are nonetheless a key component of the 
global financial infrastructure that emerged in the 2000s. From a more general viewpoint, these 
countries lack the ability to produce and apply coherent and consistent policies, thus they exhibit, to 
varying degrees, poor records of implementing major reforms. This conceptualization of the state is 
                                                 
2 Kopercky and Scherlis (2008) identify a third group of countries in which the number of posts filled by the party is 
higher and, therefore, the potential control exercised would also be higher. 
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certainly in contrast with the role of the state in advanced, institutionalized democracies 
(O’Donnell, ibid.). 
This theoretical conceptualization, drawn from literature on politics, of the varying ability of states 
to deliver on key functions has received broader empirical support in global surveys. For example, 
Kaufman et al. (2013) report significant variation in key governance indicators, including 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law. More importantly, significant 
variation also exists in these indicators even among EU member states. 
In summary, the theoretical threads on which this article is based suggest that the establishment and 
development of Anglo-American in conceptualization, OBs should be examined in relation to the 
dynamics of the political economy of the global economic system. OBs are promoted by the 
G7/G20 and other powerful global actors as a uniform solution to improve the quality of financial 
reporting and to help instill stability in a crisis-prone and interdependent global financial system. 
This need has been so profoundly exposed during the current financial crisis which has shaken the 
world economy. The proliferation of OBs in the early 2000s rests on the assumption that every 
country has the capability to successfully establish and operate accounting institutions moulded on 
Anglo-American governance regimes. 
However, the efficacy of local OBs should not be taken for granted, since countries differ in their 
historical, social, cultural and economic traditions, and these differences, in turn, may condition 
their ability to introduce systems of effective oversight and related reforms. Thus, the operation of 
emerging domestic OBs warrants close examination. Countries with a tradition of weak 
institutionalization (delegative democracies) tend to exhibit significant difficulties in importing 
reform measures developed in countries with a tradition of strong, operative institutions. The former 
tend to lack a nexus of horizontal accountability mechanisms, which thus hampers the development 
of strong OBs. Clientelism, a particular version of party patronage, is a widespread characteristic of 
political systems in certain European countries (and elsewhere) and is associated with the 
institutional weaknesses of delegative democracies and their inability to build strong, operative 
OBs. 
Research methods 
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This study follows a case study research design (Babbie, 1998; Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Yin, 2002) 
and its empirical part, which spans the period 2003–2014, is based on a mix of data sources and 
triangulation research methodology (Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1979). The data sources include a wealth 
of publically-available archival material (e.g. minutes of parliamentary debates, parliamentary 
reports, laws, ministerial decisions, articles in the press and in professional journals, as well as a 
small number of letters, memoranda and reports submitted by interested parties to the Minister of 
Economy3). The written evidence is supplemented with 10 focused, semi-structured, face-to-face 
interviews. The interviews covered, depending on the interviewee’s personal knowledge, a series of 
issues related to the establishment and performance of ELTE. Semi-structured interviews were 
recorded and professionally transcribed. Interviewees requested their names not be disclosed in the 
paper (apart from Minister Alogoskoufis, who made no such request), but agreed to disclosing the 
description of their post. Furthermore, three interviewees requested that the interview not be 
recorded and notes were taken instead. Interviewees included: the Minister of Economy (2004–
2008); the Secretary General to the Ministry of Economy (2004–2007); the two chairmen of ELTE 
(2003–2009 and 2009–2014, respectively); the President of the Institute of Certified Auditors-
Accountants of Greece (1993–present), who is also a partner in a large local audit firm; one local, 
small audit firm partner and two Big-Four audit firm partners; one senior public servant at the 
Ministry of Economy; and one member of ELTE’s Disciplinary Council. 
Our study shares limitations inherent to a qualitative methodology. In addition, we acknowledge 
that one of the authors (referred to in the paper as “Academic”) served as a member of ELTE’s 
accounting arm for two years (2005–2007). To reduce the risk of subjectivity and bias, we note that 
the paper is mostly based on publically-available written evidence, unrelated to the Academic. In 
addition, all semi-structured interviews cited herein have been conducted by the other co-authors. 
The interaction between global and local institutional settings 
The global landscape 
In Europe, public oversight of accounting and auditing emerged as a policy matter in the late 1990s, 
when the EU embarked on a review of the corporate external audit function, in light of further 
                                                 
3 All empirical sources are available on request from the authors. 
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integration (European Commission, 1998). This review resulted in the issuing of the 
Recommendation of 15 November 2000, which viewed the creation of an effective system of public 
oversight at the state level as an integral part of a single internal market (European Commission, 
2001a). Although the Recommendation was non-mandatory, it provided a clear indication of the 
EU’s preference for a system of oversight independent of the profession. It envisaged that such a 
system would be run by non-professionals, including representatives from the industry, securities 
regulators and other stakeholders. These EU measures intensified in the early 2000s and eventually 
culminated in the issuing of the (new) Eighth Directive in 2006 (European Commission, 2006). This 
piece of EU legislation requires member states to install or upgrade systems of accounting and 
auditing oversight. 
These EU measures reflected developments on the other side of the Atlantic (Davies & Green, 
2008, Malsch & Gendron, 2011). In the US, following the infamous Enron scandal and the collapse 
of Arthur Andersen in 2001, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US Congress, 2002) led to the creation of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which heralded the end of self-regulation 
for the accounting profession in the US (e.g. Anantharaman, 2012; Lennox & Pittman, 2010). The 
new regulator was charged with audit quality inspections, ending the peer-review system run 
hitherto by the US profession (ibid.). 
It is within this international context that domestic OBs began mushrooming in the early 2000s 
across the globe, as one means of regulating crisis-prone globalized capitalism (Βüthe & Mattli, 
2011; Davies & Green, 2008; Wade, 2007a). Although the argument that integrated economies 
require integrated systems of regulation and oversight has received support (Davies & Green, 
2008), OBs are set up and operate at the local, domestic level. Thus, the structure of these emerging 
systems of oversight, i.e. dispersed OBs embedded within diverse local contexts, is incongruent 
with the ever-growing integration of the global financial system. 
The need to coordinate diverse OBs was recognized in 2006 when national OBs from 18 separate 
jurisdictions set up a representative organization, the International Forum of Independent Audit 
Regulators (IFIAR). Membership has only grown to 49 as of 2014, so most UN member states have 
not yet joined. IFIAR is meant to operate as a platform for coordination, knowledge sharing and 
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dialogue among  bodies, with no enforcement power over its members4 regarding audit quality 
inspections. At the moment, coordination of national OBs through IFIAR remains rather elementary 
(Davies & Green, 2008, pp. 89–91; Humphrey et al., 2009). IFIAR issued seven non-binding5 core 
principles for its members in April 2011. Similarly to IFIAR, the European Group of Auditors’ 
Oversight Bodies established by the European Commission in 2005 lacks enforcement power6, 
since it is limited to an advisory and coordinating role within the EU. 
The local politico-economic and professional context 
As a member of the European Economic Community since the early 1980s, Greece’s position 
within the global politico-economic system has been conditioned by European policies. With regard 
to accounting and auditing in particular, relevant regulation and practice in the past three decades 
has largely been shaped by European directives (Caramanis & Dedoulis, 2011). During the past 
three decades, successive governments7 have pursued further integration of the country into the EU. 
This effort has entailed a series of liberalization reforms since the early 1990s, among them the 
liberalization of the Greek audit market in 1992 (Caramanis, 1999), and culminated in Greece’s 
entry to the euro zone8 in 2001. 
However, despite improvements in certain financial indicators, concerns have remained about the 
real growth and development of the economy. For example, Greece has consistently been the worst 
performer in terms of the criteria set out in the Lisbon Programme (e.g. World Economic Forum, 
2004, 2006). Clear signs of an economic slowdown had been apparent before the 2008 financial 
crisis erupted and the country eventually entered into a deep (and still ongoing) recession in 2009, 
                                                 
4 See https://ifiar.org/About-Us.aspx  
5 See https://ifiar.org/IFIAR/media/Documents/General/Final-Core-Principles.pdf  
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/egaob/index_en.htm 
7 From 1981 to 2012, the country had been governed by either the socialist PASOK party or the center-right New 
Democracy party. New Democracy was in power for eight of these years (1990–1993 and 2004–2009). In October 
2009, PASOK returned to power against the background of an intensifying economic crisis. A coalition government has 
been at the helm since 2012. 
8It has been argued, however, that entering the euro zone in 2001 was, to a certain degree, the result of political 
considerations at the EU level, as well as of creative accounting practices in Greece’s financial statistics (e.g. Financial 
Times, 11 and 30 November 2009). 
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amid widespread recognition that the financial crisis was a symptom of more serious, structural 
socio-political problems (e.g. OECD, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). 
Greece’s lingering economic problems are certainly related to the country’s reform capacity 
problems, resulting from its weak institutionalization and clientelistic political system (e.g. 
Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008). An OECD report (2011b) explicitly ties Greece’s problems to 
the widely-acknowledged weakness of the state apparatus: 
Strong measures … to improve the effectiveness, accountability and integrity of the 
public administration so that it is “fit for purpose” are a priority, perhaps even the first 
of the reform priorities facing Greece. Failure to implement a major and integrated 
public governance reform in Greece is likely to jeopardise the broader reforms required 
to put Greece back on the path to sustainable growth (ibid., p. 3). 
The weakness of the Greek state apparatus and its role as an impediment to progress has been 
recently highlighted by Jean-Claude Triche, head of the European Central bank (2003–2011), in the 
context of an inquiry led by the European Parliament into the handling of the Greek crisis by the 
“troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund). As Triche (2014, trans.) states: “The state in Greece does not operate the way it should ... 
[W]hat Greece should do is to continue trying to build a solid state. This is a precondition for the 
country to succeed ... and for the economy to operate”. Kaufman et al. (2013) also capture the 
weakness of Greek public administration in a global survey, in which Greece ranks at or close to the 
bottom of EU member states in key governance indicators, including government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, and rule of law. 
The international developments in accounting regulation of the late 1990s and early 2000s have 
been repeatedly and explicitly acknowledged by the Greek government as a significant factor in 
formulating policy regarding the establishment of ELTE (e.g. Greek Parliament, 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c). For example, the Minister of Economy Christodoulakis (2001–2004) stated that the 
government was trying to bring Greece closer to the global SSC system of financial regulation: “We 
are creating a new institution in order to be in a position to deal with the complexity of corporate 
audits … [W]e use the formulae that are available internationally to improve the context in which 
the markets operate and investors make decisions” (Greek Parliament, 2003c, p. 4.269, trans.). 
Similarly, the Deputy Minister of Economy Fotiadis openly acknowledged the role of international 
developments: “[T]he Enron experience has led most countries to initiate reforms in order to 
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improve the quality of audits and provide adequate assurances to the investing community ... and 
this is what we are doing” (Greek Parliament, 2003a, p. 1083, trans.). 
However, in addition to international developments, local-level events and conditions in Greece 
provided further impetus to the introduction of public oversight. As such, these conditions hastened 
the establishment of ELTE before it actually became an EU legal requirement through the issuing of 
the new Eighth Directive in 2006. One such major event was the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) 
scandal of the late 1990s, which eroded public confidence in financial reporting and the role of the 
auditing profession. An unprecedented growth in the ASE, which had created market euphoria and 
involved hundreds of thousands of Greek households, was followed by an intensive downward 
spiral. The General Index fell from 6,355 to 1,800 points within the space of a few months in the 
last quarter of 1999 (ASE, 2001). Soon, allegations appeared in the press and in public debates9 
about the role of key politicians, even of the Prime Minister himself, in the affair and such claims 
were even raised in the Parliament (Greek Parliament, 2003c; see also Papadimitriou, 2001; 
Staikouras, 2001). 
It is evident that the ASE episode created a legitimation crisis for the government. Under such 
conditions, tightening regulation or introducing more structural changes has been a state’s main 
response to crisis at various times and locales (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Malsch & Gendron, 2011; 
Zeff, 2003). Indeed, a senior public servant has linked the establishment of ELTE with the ASE 
affair, suggesting that the creation of the Greek OB “was apparently brought forward by the 
scandal” (interview, 26 September 2013). During the debate in Parliament on the establishment of 
ELTE, the sponsor of the bill emphatically suggested that the new regulation was: “an answer to 
those who argue that the government is somehow related to sleaze and scandals” (Greek Parliament, 
2003a, p. 1069, trans.), and Deputy Minister of Economy Fotiadis stated that the government sought 
to “strengthen transparency” (Greek Parliament, 2003a, p. 1083, trans.) as public confidence in the 
operation of the market had evaporated. 
The final local factor to consider is the division within the Greek auditing profession regarding the 
introduction of independent oversight, which primarily emanated from a lingering intra-professional 
                                                 
9 The ASE scandal was a major political issue in the elections of March 2000. 
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conflict. This conflict initially erupted in the late 1970s between SOL10, a quasi-state auditing 
organization, and SELE, an aspiring occupational group representing local branches of the big 
international accounting firms that had been campaigning for access to the statutory audit market 
(Caramanis, 1999). The profession was eventually liberalized in 1992 through legislation (ibid.). 
This audit reform entailed the introduction of competition between auditors and the formal 
unification of the profession as members of international accounting firms gained professional 
recognition. The reform also abolished SOL and established SOEL11, a new professional 
association, largely organized as a self-regulated professional institute. However, the formal 
unification of the profession in 1992 failed to end this intra-professional conflict which continued12, 
overtly or covertly, around the issue of the control of SOEL’s administration. Related to this 
conflict, the profession stood divided regarding the proposal for the establishment of ELTE, and 
particularly regarding the transfer of regulatory and oversight powers from SOEL to the new OB. 
The Big-Four and international second-tier firms openly supported the reform, while resistance 
mostly came from SOL SA, the largest (local) audit firm, supported by the Economic Chamber of 
Greece (OEE13), a legal, compulsory trade association of all graduates in the broader field of 
economics, including business accountants. Thus, the divided profession, apparently involved in the 
stock exchange scandal, had a significantly reduced capacity to resist reform (Caramanis, Dedoulis, 
& Leventis, 2010). 
The deep divide and the power relations within the profession were summarized in a letter to 
SOEL’s Supervisory Council, sent by a partner of a second-tier international audit firm shortly after 
the government announced its plan to set up ELTE: 
                                                 
10 SOL is the English abbreviation of the Greek Σώμα Ορκωτών Λογιστών – ΣΟΛ (Soma Orkoton Logiston – SOL), 
which translates as the Body of Sworn-in Accountants. 
11 SOEL is the English abbreviation of the Greek Σώμα Ορκωτών Ελεγκτών Λογιστών – ΣΟEΛ (Soma Orkoton 
Elegkton Logiston – SOΕL), which translates as the Institute of Certified Auditors - Accountants. 
12 There was also an abortive attempt to reverse liberalization when PASOK returned to power in 1993 (see Caramanis, 
2002, 2005). 
13 OEE is the English abbreviation of the Greek Οικονομικό Επιμελητήριο Ελλάδος – ΟΕΕ (Economico Epimelitirio 
Ellados – OEE), which translates as the Economic Chamber of Greece. OEE was established by the (PASOK) 
government in the early 1980s as a state-corporatist institution and has traditionally been an arena for party competition 
and clientelism. All practicing statutory auditors, business accountants and tax consultants must have OEE membership. 
Other membership comes from tax office and banking sector employees. OEE is still capable of exercising some 
political power, emanating from its membership, which amounts to around 90,000 individuals. However, it has failed to 
have any significant impact on accounting and related matters (Caramanis, 1999, 2005). 
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[T]he Greek profession is characterised by an extreme concentration of power in very 
few audit firms ... in practice, two blocks have been formed in the profession. The one 
that has all the power in the organs of administration and the other that is seeking to 
bring it into balance. It is this antithesis that has created many problems in the internal 
operation, status and the public image of the profession (Second-tier partner, 2002, 
trans.). 
Following the 1992 reform, the great majority of SOL members established the audit firm SOL 
SA14 under the leadership of “Unileader” (Caramanis, 2002) – the most important of the dramatis 
personae in the Greek accounting profession in the past two decades. Unileader, a charismatic ex-
trade unionist of SOL and middle-to-senior member of PASOK, also served as Secretary General 
(1996–2000) of the Ministry of Economy and, for two terms, was President of the OEE during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. The formal unification of the profession, however, did not end this 
intra-professional conflict. It continued, explicitly or implicitly, as SOL SA attempted to reverse 
liberalization following PASOK’s return to power in October 1993 (Caramanis, 2002, 2005). 
Eventually though, the intra-professional conflict seemed to abate, and a modus vivendi between the 
conflicting groups was achieved, subsequent to SOL SA’s utterly unsuccessful attack on 
liberalization in the late 1990s. Following this development, Unileader focused on consolidating his 
control over SOEL, which is funded through a legally-sanctioned 2% annual membership charge on 
audit fees. Taking advantage of the one member-one vote system of the profession, he has 
uninterruptedly been the elected President of SOEL since the early 1990s (he was re-elected in 
April 2012 for another three-year term of office). 
In summary, global influences and pressures (i.e. the EU guidelines and the precedent set by the 
PCAOB) along with local events (the ASE scandal and intra-professional conflict) created a unique 
trajectory, conducive to the emergence of a local accounting and auditing OB independent of the 
profession, well before it became a legal EU requirement. However, the delegative characteristics of 
Greece created a rather gloomy outlook for the prospect of a truly effective and independent 
accounting and auditing OB. 
The parliamentary debate: rhetoric on independence and concerns about clientelism 
                                                 
14 SOL SA is by far the largest audit firm in Greece, at least in terms of staff. As of 2010, it accounted for almost one-
third of SOEL’s membership (all ranks included) which, in the highly-politicized Greek context, is widely believed to 
give SOL SA significant bearing in the political centers of power. 
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The debate in Parliament on the establishment of ELTE15 began in spring 2003 (Greek Parliament, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c). The minutes of this debate provide useful insights into the clientelistic nature 
of Greek politics, the prevailing perceptions among politicians and the institutional impediments to 
the independence of “independent” authorities. The proceedings reveal that the risk of creating an 
impotent institution under government control in Greece was neither unforeseeable nor unforeseen, 
as shown during the debate on the bill in Parliament. 
The need to ensure that ELTE would not fall victim to party clientelism and ineffectiveness, a 
quintessential characteristic of the Greek public sector, was openly acknowledged by 
Christodoulakis (Minister of Economy 2000–2004) during the debate in Parliament: “[O]ur purpose 
is only one: to make the system for overseeing financial audits more transparent, more rigorous and 
to bring it away from the operation of the state, so that it will be able to adapt to international 
developments and will be capable of overseeing companies and inspecting auditors” (Greek 
Parliament, 2003c, p. 4269, trans., emphasis added). Yet he insisted that the Ministry maintain 
overall control over the new institution, even on technical accounting matters: “[T]he deliberations 
of ELTE shall be signed by the Minister of Economy” (Greek Parliament, 2003c, p. 4.269, trans.). 
Several speakers in the parliamentary debate, across the political spectrum, emphasized ELTE as 
being under the direct control of the incumbent Minister of Economy. The Member of Parliament 
(MP) and Shadow Minister of Economy Alogoskoufis16 expressed concerns that the creation of 
ELTE was an opportunity for the government to create posts for its political friends and allies 
(Greek Parliament, 2003b). Moreover, MPs from political parties on the left argued that, though the 
law secured independence from the profession, “ELTE lacked even a semblance of independence 
from the government” (Greek Parliament, 2003c, p. 4259, trans.), underscoring the lack of 
accountability to Parliament (Greek Parliament, 2003b, 2003c). These MPs, however, extended 
their criticism to New Democracy: “[W]hile PASOK is seeking full government control over 
                                                 
15 The government had announced its plan to establish an accounting and auditing OB and end self-regulation in July 
2002, when it published a draft bill for the creation of ELTE (Kerdos, 2002; Ministry of Economy, 2002). A long 
consultation period ended in March 2003 when the bill was introduced to Parliament, amid fierce and concerted protest 
from SOEL and OEE. Τhe bill was eventually voted for in May 2003 (Government Gazette, 2003). 
16 Alogoskoufis became Minister of Economy when New Democracy won the 2004 elections. He played a key role in 
the developments in Greek accountancy in the late 2000s, as we explain subsequently. 
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accountancy, New Democracy is essentially supporting the bill, as they expect to take political 
advantage of the new institution if they return to power” (Greek Parliament, 2003a, p. 1077, trans.). 
Overall, the debate in Parliament revealed a more general lack of trust in public authorities (which 
are normally presumed to be independent of government and party-political influences and 
pressures) as a precondition for the smooth functioning of the free market economy (O’Donnell, 
1994). It is indicative that, when the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chamber 
announced that the heads of the Capital Markets Commission and the ASE (traditionally devoted 
government appointees) had been invited to express their views on the establishment of ELTE, MP 
Alogoskoufis a priori discredited their testimony and suggested that there was no need to invite 
them because “on the basis of past experience [they] come to the Parliament only to support the 
government’s views. We shall not learn anything more than what the government and the Minister 
will tell us” (Greek Parliament, 2003a, p. 1068, trans.). He also explicitly recognized the issue of 
state ineffectiveness: 
The question of the credibility of financial audits is not only a matter of institutions and 
legislation … [W]e already had [institutions that did not work and] adequately strong 
legislation which was not enforced in practice and this resulted in the serious problems 
of the Athens Stock Exchange [the 1999 scandal] … [W]e shall vote for the bill because 
we want to indicate that … there is a need for more effective audits and more reliable 
financial statements … particularly in state-controlled organizations (Greek Parliament, 
2003c, p. 4264, trans.). 
The issues of clientelism and lack of true independence of OBs from the government were most 
explicitly captured by MP Lafazanis thus: 
The independence of “independent” authorities is a mockery … You appoint hangers-on 
to various posts, you name them independent, and then [when things go wrong] you 
come to say that they have failed and put the blame on them so that you remain 
protected from criticism. I would prefer, Mr Minister, that you personally have the 
political responsibility [for overseeing corporate auditing] (Greek Parliament, 2003c, p. 
4259, trans.). 
However, regardless of any arguments during the debate in Parliament, senior politicians (at least 
when in power) showed clearly negative attitudes toward truly independent authorities outside the 
control of the political system, an observation in congruence with O’Donnell’s theorization of 
delegative democracies (1994). As the Secretary General (2004–2007) put it in an interview well 
after he left office: “Ministers tend to have the view that independent authorities should be at an 
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arm’s length … [They] should be independent but not too much so” (interview, 14 July 2010, 
trans.). That is, ministers want to maintain control over independent authorities. The way the 
Minister of Economy (2004–2009) under New Democracy rationalized this attitude against truly 
independent bodies is illuminating: 
There are two kinds of risks associated with independent authorities. Either they will not 
do the job they are established for, or they will be overactive, causing problems for the 
operation of the market … [in Greece and] ... they are in a position to hold the Minister 
to ransom … and blackmail the government … because they have all the information 
and the Minister is very vulnerable to adverse publicity (interview, 14 July 2010, trans.). 
The establishment of ELTE: subjugating the new OB to government control 
The Greek OB was eventually established by Law 3148/2003 (Government Gazette, 2003), in May 
2003 (the appendix presents the time line of major events in the history of ELTE since July 2002, 
when the government announced its decision to establish an accounting and auditing OB). 
Following the international trend (EU guidelines and the PCAOB precedent), the Law secured the 
independence of ELTE from the profession. 
Formally, ELTE was set up as a public sector legal entity and its mission is to “promote 
transparency in the operation of business enterprises through accounting standardization, and to 
ensure the quality of corporate audits” (article 1 of the Law, trans.), and to act as the government’s 
formal advisor on accounting and auditing matters. ELTE is funded by audit firms through a 1% 
levy on total audit fees17, which secures the availability of necessary financial resources. 
As figure 1 shows, ELTE is headed by a chairman and two vice-chairmen, who constitute its 
powerful Executive Committee. The chairman and one vice-chairman are selected by the Ministry 
of Economy and the second vice-chairman is nominated by OEE18, whose leadership at the time 
was controlled by the governing PASOK. All appointments require confirmation from Parliament. 
ELTE’s administrative structure is supplemented by a seven-member Administrative Council, 
comprising three members of the Executive Committee and four other individuals nominated by the 
                                                 
17 This, as of 2010, amounted to almost € 2m per annum in total revenue for ELTE. 
18 The OEE gained the right to nominate one vice-chairman of ELTE as a result of its electoral power and effective 
political mobilization during the debate in the chamber (see Greek Parliament, 2003a, 2003b, and 2003c). 
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Bank of Greece, the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, the Confederation of Greek Industries, 
and the accounting profession19 (SOEL). 
Figure 1. The administrative structure of ELTE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the umbrella of ELTE, two organs were created. The first is SLOT20 (Accounting 
Standardization Committee), which comprises four accounting experts appointed by the Ministry of 
Economy and is headed by one of ELTE’s two vice-chairmen. The second is SPE21 (Quality 
Inspections Committee), which is a seven-member committee headed by the second vice-chairman 
of ELTE. The remaining members of SPE include a senior judge, one member of SLOT and four 
other individuals nominated by the Bank of Greece, the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, 
SOEL, and the Ministry of Economy. SPE’s main responsibility is the management of a peer-
review-based quality inspection system that was to be introduced. 
                                                 
19 The initially-submitted Law did not provide for representation of the profession in ELTE. However, political pressure 
during the discussion in Parliament gave SOEL one seat on ELTE’s Administrative Council (see Greek Parliament, 
2003a, 2003b, and 2003c). 
20 SLOT is the Greek acronym of Συμβούλιο Λογιστικής Τυποποίησης – ΣΛΟΤ, which translates as the Accounting 
Standardization Committee. 
21 SPE is the Greek acronym of Συμβούλιο Ποιοτικού Ελέγχου – ΣΠΕ, which translates as the Quality Inspections 
Committee – SPE). The appointment of SPE members is controlled by the Minister of Economy. 
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In addition to directly appointing the three heads of ELTE and the members of SLOT, the 
nominations for membership of ELTE’s Administrative Council (four) and of the Quality 
Inspections Committee (five) require formal approval from the Ministry of Economy. Furthermore, 
the Ministry of Economy exercises oversight of ELTE’s operations, determines the remuneration of 
its senior staff, and approves the appointment of administrative personnel. Even ELTE’s regulatory 
decisions on technical issues are subject to approval by the Ministry of Economy. Finally, Law 
3148/2003 removed the disciplinary power of SOEL and provided for the establishment of a new 
system of disciplinary arrangements22, independent of the profession, which would operate in 
parallel with ELTE. The members of the Disciplinary Council were to be appointed by the 
government. Furthermore, auditor independence was to be strengthened through the introduction of 
provisions on various issues (e.g. auditor rotation, employment of audit staff by the client, 
consulting services to audit clients). 
The formal passing of Law 3148/2003 and the establishment of ELTE as the first OB in the history 
of Greek accounting and auditing naturally created expectations of much-needed improvements in 
Greek financial reporting23. However, given the deeply politicized nature of the Greek state and the 
lingering ineffectiveness of public administration, the close control of ELTE by the government 
apparently gave cause for concern from the outset, and called into question whether ELTE as an 
institution would in practice play the vital role for which it had formally been established. We turn 
to this issue in the next section. 
ELTE in a state of inertia 
ELTE was envisaged to play a key role in ensuring much-needed transparency and confidence in 
financial reporting. This would be achieved by improving the quality of corporate audits through 
the introduction of a system of audit quality inspections. However, since its inception in May 2003, 
ELTE has, in practice, fallen into an essentially dormant state with regard to improving 
transparency and confidence in financial reporting. ELTE’s situation was acknowledged by its 
                                                 
22 The bill initially provided for severe monetary fines for errant auditors and audit firms, but these penalties were 
significantly softened in the final text of the law, as the profession stood united against them. 
23 According to academic research, Greece has a leading position in earnings management internationally (Christensen 
et al., 2012; Leuz et al., 2003; Osma & Pope, 2011). 
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chairman (since 2009) in an interview with the influential quarterly Accountancy Greece, issued by 
SOEL for its membership: 
As you know, since its establishment in 2003, ELTE has been in a state of inertia … 
understaffed, without [proper] offices, incapable of performing its duties and, most 
importantly, unable to conduct the audit quality inspections required by legislation since 
2003 ... It is imperative that the Authority be staffed with qualified personnel as a matter 
of urgency (Refenes, 2011, p. 29, trans.). 
The poor state of ELTE was documented in an academic survey of auditors and corporate financial 
executives (Caramanis & Papadakis, 2008). The survey, which attracted significant media attention, 
revealed that Greek oversight authorities were in need of significant improvements in several 
respects, including: reliability, transparency, staffing, and independence from political and 
economic centers of power (e.g. Kerdos, 2008; Kourkouta, 2008; Naftemporiki, 2008). The headline 
of the newspaper Kerdos (2008, p. 14, trans.) read: “The deficiencies of the oversight authorities 
cast doubt on the benefits of the introduction of IFRSs”. ELTE’s poor state of affairs was also 
evidenced by its development of a web page as late as spring 2009, six years after its establishment; 
a web presence had been agreed on early in 2005, since it was considered a key factor in effecting 
change and ensuring transparency and accountability (SLOT, 2005). 
The failure of ELTE to perform its duties over the years has been indicated in internal documents 
prepared by the Academic member of SLOT and a retired senior judge-member of the SPE and 
submitted to the Ministry of Economy (Academic, 2006, 2007, 2008; Retired Judge, 2006a, 2006b). 
ELTE’s deplorable position has also been highlighted in two parliamentary questions raised by MPs 
Tatoulis (2009) and Katseli (2009). In her question, Katseli particularly stressed that “ELTE ... with 
a leadership appointed by the government has fallen victim to the pathogenesis of Greek public 
administration” (Katseli, 2009, p. 2, trans.). The Secretary General 2004–2007 and the Minister of 
Economy (2004–2008) also both acknowledged that ELTE had failed to improve Greek accounting 
and audit practice and, in retrospect, implicitly expressed their regret for not taking appropriate 
measures while in power (both interviewed on 14 July 2010). 
ELTE’s inaction is most evident with regard to quality inspections. Following the filling of the SPE 
posts in March 2006, ELTE initiated the organization of the first audit quality inspections in the 
history of Greek auditing in July 2006, three years after its establishment. However, this attempt 
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utterly failed: “[I]t became clear that we did not have a safe legal framework to proceed, we did not 
have our own audit quality inspectors ... it would be a mockery to perform inspections under such 
conditions” (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2003–2009, 26 September 2013, trans.). Two 
years after this incident, the government eventually passed Law 3693/2008, which, inter alia, 
abolished the peer-review system and provided that ELTE would appoint its own audit quality 
inspectors. However, ELTE did not have the authority to proceed with filling the posts of quality 
inspectors, as recruitments were subject to the Ministry’s approval. It took one year (July 2009) for 
ELTE to receive permission from the Ministry of Economy to appoint five qualified members of 
staff for the audit quality inspections on a one-year employment contract (ELTE, 2009). Using the 
limited human resources available, ELTE was eventually able to complete the first audit quality 
inspections as late as April 2010, seven years after its inception (ELTE, 2010). The main findings of 
these inspections were presented at a public event on 14 April 2010. ELTE’s chairman publicly 
admitted in his speech that ELTE had adopted a largely “educational” approach and no disciplinary 
action was taken. He made clear though that ELTE would exercise disciplinary action against any 
deviant auditors in the next round of inspections. 
However, the work contracts of ELTE’s inspectors expired in spring 2010, and, as no permission 
for new appointments had been granted by the Ministry of Economy, ELTE had insufficient human 
resources even for minimum operations. Yet Greece still needed to comply with the requirement of 
the Eighth Directive for audit quality inspections on a regular basis (interview with the Chairman of 
ELTE 2009–2014, 26 July 2013). To deal with this problem, shortly thereafter an arrangement was 
made between ELTE and SOEL, with the permission of the Ministry of Economy, according to 
which SOEL appointed two inspectors who were then seconded to ELTE (interviews with the 
President of SOEL, 19/07/2013; Chairman of ELTE 2009–2014, 26/07/2013). The two individuals 
would mainly deal with urgent investigations ordered within the context of judicial procedures, 
following major, or sometimes more minor, auditing scandal (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 
2009–2014, 26/07/2013). 
Nevertheless, ELTE’s performance eventually came under legal scrutiny. On 5 April 2012, the 
public prosecutor for economic affairs ordered an investigation into ELTE’s apparent inaction by 
the Internal Audit Service of Public Administration (Kousoulos & Vlachoutsakos, 2012). The 
judicial investigation was provoked by written allegations by individuals (investors claiming 
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financial losses as a result of ELTE’s inaction) that had been submitted to the Ministry of Economy 
and various judicial authorities (ibid.). The report of the Internal Audit Service of Public 
Administration found that ELTE had in fact failed to perform its responsibilities, but attributed this 
to lack of staff (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2009–2014, 26 July 2013). 
In January 2013, ELTE received permission from the Ministry of Economy to outsource the 
implementation of audit quality inspections, since public sector appointments had essentially been 
banned since 2010 due to the financial crisis. The contract was awarded to SOEL, the professional 
organisation representing the auditing profession, which appointed six individuals from the 
relatively junior staff of audit firms on fixed-term contracts (interview with the Chairman of ELTE, 
26 July 2013). The arrangement was in clear violation of core principle 5 of IFIAR (2014), of which 
ELTE is a member. According to Principle 5: 
Audit regulators should have arrangements in place to ensure that inspection staff 
members are independent of the profession. These arrangements will, as a minimum, 
include ensuring that staff members should not be practicing auditors or employed by or 
affiliated with an audit firm, and that the arrangements are not controlled in any form by a 
professional body. 
The problem with the IFIAR requirement was acknowledged by the Chairman of ELTE who 
explained that “in the prevailing political circumstances, there was no other option ... this was as far 
as we could go” (interview with the Chairman of ELTE, 26 July 2013, trans.). Furthermore, 
questions have been raised as to the technical ability of the staff appointed to perform effective 
quality inspections of the audit files of large and complex organizations such as banks and 
insurance companies (interviews with two Big-Four audit firm partners, 6 and 7 September 2013). 
This is another violation of IFIAR’s principle 5 that inspection staff be of appropriate competence. 
The Chairman of ELTE 2003–2009 voiced his concerns thus: “I do not know the inspectors 
personally, so I cannot comment on their technical competence. But there is an obvious question as 
regards the credibility of inspections performed by staff members appointed by the profession … at 
the very least they lack the appearance of independence” (interview, 16 September 2013, trans.). 
The performance of audit quality inspections had the backing of the profession, in an attempt to 
deal with an acute drop in audit fees in the middle of the ongoing financial crisis (interview with the 
President of SOEL, 27 July 2013). Even before the advent of the crisis in 2008, a survey found that 
a significant majority (two-thirds) of auditors supported quality inspections as a means of 
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maintaining audit fees at a satisfactory level (Caramanis & Papadakis, 2008, p. 47). A senior partner 
in a Big-Four firm put it thus: “We do believe that audit quality inspections are in the interests of 
the profession ... to improve credibility and as a safeguard against unfair competition” (interview, 6 
September 2013, trans.). No such inspections had yet been completed as of July 2013, and ELTE 
still appears to remain in an essentially dormant state ten years after its establishment. 
The inertia of ELTE has been complemented by inaction on the part of the profession’s Disciplinary 
Council, in which ELTE plays a de facto coordinating role. During the past decade, four cases 
(alleged audit scandals) have been referred to the council by ELTE (two in 2011 and two in 2013), 
but none had been concluded as of April 2013 (Refenes, 2013). A member of ELTE’s Disciplinary 
Council gave his insight into the apparent inaction thus: 
One key obstacle to the effective operation of the disciplinary function is the fact that 
we are essentially unpaid and on top of that there is no legal immunity or other 
protection. If we impose a penalty on an audit firm, we run the risk of facing claims for 
damages or even criminal charges on the part of the audit firm ... and the legal 
environment is quite vague. It seems to me that nobody really cares about what the 
Council does or does not do, or what needs to be done to enable the Council to perform 
its duties properly. (interview, 14 July 2013, trans.) 
The inertia of ELTE and the absence of an operating Disciplinary Council have been vividly noted 
by a senior Big-Four partner: “ELTE has done nothing at all … has performed no audit quality 
inspections, although it should have. the Disciplinary Council has not been functioning … we know 
there are cases which have been pending for a very long time … Unfortunately, we have missed the 
opportunity to improve the status of the profession … and you know we pay for ELTE every year as 
required by law” (interview, 7 September 2013, trans.). 
Explaining inertia: institutional features of a delegative democracy 
The establishment of ELTE as a public sector entity under the supervision and control of the 
Ministry of Economy firmly anchored the new OB to the Greek state apparatus. This lack of 
independence has implications that go beyond the ability of an OB to express a view that might put 
the incumbent government in an awkward position. As the case of the Greek OB shows, lack of 
independence from the government (and general lack of autonomy) in a political system of 
governance permeated by a tradition of party politics and clientelism, increases the risk of being 
caught in the cogs of state indifference, red tape, and ineffectiveness (O’Donnell, 1994). In practice, 
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these interrelated factors include the inability of the OB to deal with basic organizational issues and 
develop into a functioning institution. 
The Chairman of ELTE 2003–2009 commented on the independence of ELTE from the government 
thus: 
As I understand it, at the core of EU policy in relation to oversight has been 
independence from the profession and this has been secured ... In retrospect, 
independence from the Greek Ministry of Economy is an equally important issue ... I 
had talked on a number of occasions to the Minister of Economy regarding the need to 
ensure ELTE’s independence from the government; I had been reassured that 
appropriate action would be taken but the issue remains unresolved … ELTE is still a 
public sector legal entity under the control of the Ministry (interview, 16 September 
2013, trans.). 
Next, we examine the modes that hampered the development of institutions of horizontal 
accountability. 
Party politics and clientelism 
In Greek political tradition (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008; Lyrintzis, 2005), the appointment 
of (key) staff is mostly, though not exclusively, made on the basis of political affiliations rather than 
merit and capacity to deliver: 
In my experience, loyalty or networking is the key factor for appointments to public 
posts. We often see unqualified and indifferent people get key posts. It is loyalty and 
networking rather than personal aptitude and knowledge that count. There is a golden 
rule and in the past some appointees have learned it the hard way: do not attempt to 
make waves if you want to keep your job ... and it pays off ... it secures a significant 
source of income (interview with a certified auditor with considerable experience as a 
member of various accounting regulatory and oversight authorities, 8 September 2008, 
trans.) 
A member of ELTE’s leading elite offered his view on the role of party affiliations in filling posts 
in ELTE thus: “I think, to a significant extent, when ELTE was established the logic of the 
government was to cover the [EU] requirement and ... to accommodate some of the party people” 
(interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2009–2014, 26 July 2013, trans.). 
Party political affiliations have consistently played a significant role in filling key positions in 
ELTE (interview with a senior public servant at the Ministry of Economy, 26 September 2013). An 
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active certified auditor and senior partner24 in a Big-Four audit firm was appointed as the first 
chairman of ELTE in August 2003; and a senior member of the OEE, who was a unionist affiliated 
with the governing PASOK party, was appointed as vice-chairman and head of SPE. The post of the 
second vice-chairman (head of SLOT) was filled by an elderly independent accountant and key 
figure in the old Greek accounting establishment (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2003–
2009, 16 September 2013). The two vice-chairmen did not subscribe to the idea of introducing 
major reforms to Greek accounting and auditing (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2003–2009, 
16 September 2013). 
Significantly, the government showed no interest in filling the remaining posts in ELTE. In March 
2004, PASOK lost the elections and the center-right New Democracy party came into power. 
Alogoskoufis was sworn in as Minister of Economy, and another person, affiliated with the 
governing party, was appointed as Secretary General25 to the Ministry of Economy. Despite his 
strong rhetoric in favor of independence from the state during the passing of the Law through 
Parliament that established ELTE, the new Minister passed article 18 of Law 3301/2004 in 
December 2004, which brought ELTE under even closer government control and abolished OEE’s 
and SOEL’s rights to nominate members to ELTE’s organs of administration (Government Gazette, 
2004). According to the new Law, the government would appoint two public servants from the 
Ministry of Economy as the two vice-chairmen of ELTE, and one member of its Administrative 
Council would be nominated by the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece26. 
The government (New Democracy) changed the composition of ELTE’s Administrative Council in 
early February 2005 (Naftemporiki, 2005). The two vice-chairmen initially appointed by PASOK 
were replaced by two public servants from the Ministry of Economy, both of whom were openly 
associated with the governing party (interview with the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Economy 2004–2007, 14 July 2010). In particular, at the time of appointment, one of the two 
individuals was serving as the Director of the Minister’s Political Office, a position he continued to 
                                                 
24 On accepting his appointment, this individual formally went on a voluntary suspension from practice. 
25 The Secretary General formally oversaw the operation of ELTE, but the power now rests with the Minister who is the 
real decision maker. The individual concerned maintained his post until March 2007, when he moved to another post. 
He was replaced as Secretary General by a retired senior public servant of the Ministry of Economy. 
26 According to a senior public servant, this was a request by the then Deputy Minister of Economy who was elected in 
Thessaloniki, the largest city of Northern Greece (interview, 26 September 2014). 
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hold for one and a half years after his appointment (interview with the Secretary General of the 
Ministry of Economy 2004–2007, 14 July 2010). The chairman of ELTE maintained his post. 
After he left office, the Minister of Economy (2004–2008) under New Democracy acknowledged 
the influence of clientelism on ELTE and explained the government’s policy on filling key positions 
in ELTE thus: “[The Chairman of ELTE] was not a political friend of mine, I did not know him 
personally. He was a professional man, knowledgeable in accounting and auditing. Certainly, he 
had been appointed by the previous government [but] I was of the view that he should stay to give 
the message that the state has continuity” (interview, 14 July 2010, trans.). However, he admitted 
that the two vice-chairmen were party devotees, “but what is important is that the Chairman was not 
… ideally no one should be … but, you know, a vicious precedent [clientelistic appointments] has 
long been set in public administration” (interview, 14 July 2010). Thus, keeping the chairman of 
ELTE, who had been appointed by the previous government, also served legitimation purposes. 
In January 2009, Alogoskoufis was removed, and Papathanasiou became the new Minister of 
Economy. The change of minister would, in the Greek political tradition, ordinarily raise 
expectations of a change in ELTE’s leadership. Indeed, the new Minister of Economy replaced two 
of the three members of ELTE’s Administrative Council. On 3 April 2009, he appointed a Professor 
of Finance as chairman and a retired Big-Four partner as vice-chairman of the SPE (the audit 
quality inspection unit of ELTE) (Government Gazette, 2009). No further changes in the leadership 
of ELTE have taken place up to the time of writing this article. 
Clientelism and weak institutionalization are also evident in recurring incidents of a conflict of 
interest regarding ELTE’s leading elite. In July 2007, the chairman of ELTE (2003–2009) was 
appointed non-executive director to a “regulatoree”, a large listed Greek bank (see Express, 2007), 
and a year later he became chief of the bank’s General Directorate – Internal Control according to 
the bank’s press bulletin of 31 July 2008. In a similar vein, in July 2008 the vice-chairman of ELTE 
(the head of SPE from 2003–2009) and one of the Minister’s close associates became chairman and 
chief executive officer of a large pension fund whose financial statements are subject to statutory 
audit. Another incident occurred in the early 2010s when the (new) vice-chairmen of ELTE (2009–
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present) accepted an appointment with the audit committee of a major listed Greek bank27 and a 
second appointment as chairman of the board of directors at an insurance company28. 
These instances of apparent conflicts of interest have been discussed within professional circles and 
at the Ministry of Economy (interview with a retired senior public servant of the Ministry of 
Economy, 26 September 2013). Eventually, these issues were published in the press29 (e.g. To 
Vima, 2009) and provoked parliamentary questions (Katseli, 2009; Nikolopoulos, 2014; Tatoulis, 
2009). These conflict of interest incidents do not apparently violate Greek law but certainly 
constitute a severe violation of the independence requirements of OBs (IFIAR, 2014). 
State indifference and ineffectiveness 
Against the backdrop of party politics and clientelism, the risk of ELTE being affected by state 
indifference and ineffectiveness became evident. ELTE was infected by the “deeply rooted … 
culture of inertia, slackness and laxity [within the Greek public sector] ... If making or 
implementing a decision is delayed, nothing bad will happen ... the ship will not sink ... you know, 
it has taken some ten years for the Greek Capital Markets Commission [formally established in 
1990] to start producing some results” (interview with the Secretary General to the Ministry of 
Economy 2004–2007, 14 July 2010, trans.). The Chairman of ELTE (2009–2014) also emphasized 
that, “the state, whatever we mean by this, has been a serious obstacle ... It has really inhibited the 
development of ELTE (interview 26 July 2013, trans.). Our research has indeed identified a chronic 
lack of active interest on the part of the Ministry of Economy in relation to the effective operation 
of ELTE: “Although there had been pressure from market forces [to improve accounting and audit 
practice] ... [a]ccounting has essentially been a second, if not third, priority issue for the Ministry” 
(interview with the Secretary General to the Ministry of Economy 2004–2007, 10 July 2010, trans.). 
The chronic lack of interest in ELTE on the part of the government was highlighted by both 
chairmen of ELTE, 2003–2009 and 2009–2014 (interviews, 26 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 
respectively). 
                                                 
27 See the 2010 financial statements of the National Bank of Greece, p. 170. 
28 See http://www.interasco.gr/hilton.asp (in Greek). 
29 This adverse publicity might have played a role in the change in ELTE’s leadership in April 2009. 
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The state’s indifference is also evident in the delay with which the government filled various posts 
in ELTE. Although the three heads of ELTE’s Executive Committee, along with the remaining four 
posts in its Administrative Council and one receptionist-secretary, had been appointed by the end of 
August 2003 (Naftemporiki, 2003), the filling of the positions in SLOT (the accounting 
standardization committee) took place in February 2005 (Government Gazette, 2005); and the 
appointment of members of SPE (the audit quality inspections committee) was delayed until March 
2006 (Ministry of Economy, 2006), three years after the establishment of ELTE. Yet these 
appointments were clearly essential even for the most basic operations of ELTE. At times, the 
proper functioning of ELTE has been derailed by inefficiency in the operation of other state 
institutions: “[I]t took some 20 months for the Council of the State [the highest civil court] to 
approve the rules and regulations of ELTE, [which include provisions and bylaws] essential for 
providing us with some legal security for the decisions we make” (interview with the Chairman of 
ELTE 2009–2014, 26 July 2013, trans.). 
Underlying the indifference on the part of government, a view commonly held in Greece is that, 
regardless of any formal requirement, inaction or avoiding tough issues secures extended terms for 
officeholders by reducing any adverse reaction or “political cost”, i.e. the estrangement of political 
friends and supporters (interview with the President of SOEL, 19 July 2013). Furthermore, inaction 
is encouraged by the complexity of public administration rules and a subtle system for avoiding 
responsibility. For example, certain issues, such as the supervision of ELTE, may fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Secretary General, who is formally overseen by the Minister: “[M]y directions to 
the Secretary General have been crystal clear, that he should perform the responsibilities that legally 
belong to him” (Minister of Economy 2004–2008, interview, 10 July 2010, trans.). However, in 
practice: 
Greece’s political and public administration systems are built in such a way that even 
minor issues must have the approval of the Minister ... ministers usually like to keep 
control while the bureaucracy tend to avoid taking responsibility. They [the bureaucracy] 
keep asking for directions from the Minister or the Secretary General to appear agreeable, 
and yet they write documents and decisions in such a way so that they cannot be held 
responsible ... the public administration does not work in the right way and this is an issue 
for the political system to sort out (interview with the Secretary General 2004–2007, 10 
July 2010, trans.). 
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Politicians may pass the buck simply by stating a lack of briefing or understanding of the issues 
involved and invoking the role of bureaucracy: “I have always passed any issues raised referring to 
problems with ELTE straight on to the competent services of the Ministry” (interview with the 
Minister of Economy 2004–2009, 14 July 2010, trans.). Then, an unwritten rule in Greek public 
administration essentially insulates politicians from criticism. That is, recommendations by 
subordinates to the Minister are formally submitted only when they have a green light (from the 
Minister) to do so (interview with the Secretary General 2004–2007, 10 July 2010). Thus, the 
Minister can always legitimize his decisions by arguing: “I have always acted upon the formal 
recommendations of the services of the Ministry” (interview with the Minister of Economy 2004–
2009, 14 July 2010, trans.). 
Furthermore, as a public sector body, ELTE has been affected by the austerity measures taken as a 
result of the ongoing economic crisis. Indeed, ELTE remains subject to the provisions of the 
memorandum(s) of understanding, agreed on since 2010 between Greece and its lenders (the troika 
of the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund). 
These measures, in view of the severity of the country’s financial crisis, have imposed significant 
reductions in salaries and restrictions on appointments within the public sector. The austerity 
package that followed the memorandum of understanding has been applied across the entire Greek 
public sector. 
The leadership of ELTE tried to convince the government to exempt ELTE from the restrictions 
following the memorandum of understanding (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2009–2014, 
26 July 2013), which was confirmed by a senior partner in a Big-Four firm: “I do know that appeals 
were made to the Minister of Economy, even to the Prime Minister himself and to the troika ... to 
exempt ELTE ... but they had no effect” (interview, 6 September 2013, trans.). This attempt failed 
completely because politicians “do not appreciate the role of independent quality inspections for the 
market ... they do not understand the role of an audit ... they simply do not care ... [I]t is a wider 
cultural issue which I have been witnessing for decades” (interview with the Chairman of ELTE 
2003–2009, 6 September 2013, trans.). 
Thus, ELTE has not been given permission by the Ministry of Economy to appoint its own qualified 
staff, including audit quality inspectors. Even if appointments were allowed, “ELTE will not be able 
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to attract suitably qualified staff at the very low public sector salary rates it legally has to follow” 
(interview with the Chairman of ELTE 2003–2009, 6 September 2013, trans.). As a partner in a 
Big-Four firm put it: 
[I]f one is earning €6,000 month how would he or she decide to become an audit quality 
inspector and earn €1,500 a month? ... From my professional experience over the past 
30 years, if you want to neutralize an institution, a function or a process, you just do not 
provide the required resources ... and it is dead. I do not have concrete evidence that 
there is necessarily an evil plan worked out but ... (interview, 6 September, 2013, trans.). 
Or, as the senior partner put it: “[In other countries] they headhunt to get the best audit quality 
inspectors ... Here they seem to believe that badly paid civil servants will be able to inspect highly 
technical work performed by the best auditors ... isn’t it a joke?” (interview, 6 September, 2013, 
trans.).  
This section exposes key features of the Greek political system that have inhibited the development 
of ELTE as an institution. The issue of ELTE’s poor performance was directly raised with the 
Secretary General (2004–2007) and the Minister of Economy (2004–2008) in interviews conducted 
for this study (both on 10 July 2010). Both interviewees agreed that ELTE has essentially remained 
in a dormant state. They also provided some explanations as to the government’s lack of appropriate 
action, namely: much-needed structural reforms often take years to produce results, which leads to 
politicians being reluctant to undertake such long-term projects (their average term of office in the 
Ministry is usually much shorter and, thus, other politicians may reap the benefits); there is a lack of 
strong, independent, and reform-minded bureaucracy that could push changes through; and, lastly, 
there is also a widespread lack of trust among the key participants in public administration. These 
issues also appeared, quite often and to varying degrees, in interviews conducted with key 
individuals from the accounting profession and members of ELTE, in the context of this study. 
Concluding remarks 
The construction of accounting and auditing OBs at the national level is being promoted as a key 
component of the global financial architecture that has emerged since the 1990s. Operating within 
distinctively diverse local political, economic, and cultural contexts, OBs are considered a uniform 
solution at the global level, aimed at ensuring high-quality financial information to facilitate the 
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flow of capital across national borders and provide stability to the interdependent global financial 
system. 
In this article, we examine the creation and operation of an OB in a local European setting by 
employing an institutional approach located within the broader political-economy framework of 
global capitalism (Arnold, 2009b, 2012; Wade, 2007a, 2007b). Consequently, we place emphasis on 
the interaction between global structural factors, institutions, influences, and pressures (namely the 
unfolding of the SSC project), and the local socio-political characteristics that condition the 
establishment and effective operation of OBs at a local (state) level. Our analysis is informed by 
O’Donnell’s (1994) conceptualization of delegative democracy, supplemented by literature on 
economic and political reform in Europe (e.g. Dyson & Goetz, 2003; Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 
2008; Radaelli, 2003). 
By analyzing a wealth of primary and secondary research material, we illustrate the difficulties and 
constraints of transplanting and operating OBs which are modeled on the external Anglo-American 
tradition. Our findings show that deeply-ingrained domestic socio-political characteristics of a 
delegative nature have indeed inhibited the development and operation of the local Greek OB, as 
O’Donnell (1994) posits. That is, the newly-established OB has been affected, since inception, by 
the all-pervasive clientelistic political system, the weaknesses of state apparatus, and the country’s 
reform (in)capacity problems. More specifically, the appointment of ELTE’s elite has been decided 
by successive governments, mainly on the basis of clientelism and political patronage. In addition, 
ELTE has been under the bureaucratic control of state machinery, despite being privately funded by 
the profession. Even basic administrative decisions, such as the appointment of audit quality 
inspectors and administrative staff, need the ex ante approval of the Ministry of Economy. 
The Greek OB has remained in a dormant state since its inception. It still lacks appropriate 
infrastructure and sufficient administrative personnel and has not been granted permission by the 
government to appoint its own audit quality inspectors. As a consequence, the performance of audit 
quality inspections has been, at best, erratic. Currently, such inspections can be performed only by 
outsourcing to the professional body, in contravention of IFIAR’s core principle on independence. 
The disciplinary function appears to have been stalled for years, despite the existence of several 
pending cases. In short, ELTE as an institution has failed to become a significant decisional point in 
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the flow of influence, power and policy in the realm of accounting, which is so important for 
effecting progress. 
Our analysis shows that ELTE’s decade-long failure is related to the country’s delegative 
characteristics. The Ministry of Economy has failed to take effective corrective action and there is 
evidence of distrust or distaste toward truly independent authorities that would act as mechanisms 
of horizontal control. In a sense, the case of the Greek OB illustrates a form of social homeostasis. 
In other words, the complex, multifaceted and interdependent system of economic and political 
power of the country has thwarted the emergence of a truly independent and effective OB in the 
accounting realm and, as such, has essentially maintained its equilibrium. 
Furthermore, by extrapolation, problems in the effective operation of institutions, including 
accounting and auditing OBs, seem to extend far beyond the borders of Greece, as literature from 
the fields of politics and social/economic reforms indicates (e.g. Dyson & Goetz, 2003). Party 
patronage, clientelism, institutional weaknesses, and state ineffectiveness are not ingrained features 
exclusive to Greece. Rather, they occur, albeit in varying degrees and forms, in several other 
jurisdictions (O’Donnell, 1994). The newcomers to domestic institutional terrains in accounting and 
auditing are potentially vulnerable to the pathogenesis of local political systems and, in particular, 
the long historical traditions of party patronage and state ineffectiveness. Thus, while the existing 
system of oversight appears to be secure against the Scylla of traditional professional control, no 
care has been taken to deal with the Charybdis of the clientelistic political system, weak 
institutionalization and state ineffectiveness which are so prevalent in several jurisdictions in 
Europe and beyond (e.g. Kaufmann et al., 2013). 
At a more general level, our analysis draws attention to the structural mismatching between the 
global nature of the international financial architecture underpinning today’s economic integration 
and the fragmented character of public oversight that operates on a country-by-country basis, 
embedded within its domestic socio-political and economic constraints. This mismatch raises 
concerns about the effectiveness of OBs embedded within geographically and socio-politically 
dispersed domestic institutional contexts. 
Our study contributes to current academic literature on accounting regulation. We employ 
O’Donnell’s (1994) conception of delegative versus representative democracy, enriched with 
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elements of the broader political economy perspective, to offer a methodological framework for 
examining the transplanting of externally-induced reforms to diverse local settings. Through the 
analysis of the Greek OB, we illuminate how local socio-political factors, influences, and pressures 
condition and eventually limit the effective operation of local OBs. In particular, our case study 
evidence shows how, in a country exhibiting characteristics of a delegative democracy, the new 
accounting OB is assimilated into the local socio-political tradition and preexisting ineffective state 
structures and remains essentially dormant. This finding lends further support to the literature on 
social and economic reforms in Europe and elsewhere which argues that, for economic, political, 
and historical reasons, some countries have not been able to successfully transplant externally-
designed institutions to local settings. 
This analysis of the Greek OB has significant implications regarding the suitability of a global 
system of oversight and should be of interest to global and local policy makers, the academic 
community, and various other stakeholders in financial reporting. The evidence of our case study 
questions the underlying rationale of pursuing stability in the global, complex and interdependent 
financial system through the instigation of domestic OBs modeled on Anglo-American traditions 
and operating in diverse national environments. We demonstrate that the establishment of 
accounting and auditing OBs does not automatically translate into concrete benefits to financial 
regulation and the quality of financial reporting. Structural weaknesses at the local level, and the 
socio-political fabric and power relations underlying them, result in weak and ineffective local OBs. 
As a result, material reforms needed at the local level fail to materialize, and imbalances and 
inequalities among states in the global landscape are maintained (Arnold, 2012; Wade, 2007a, 
2007b). Finally, regarding the accounting profession, we note that the lack of (or ineffective) 
oversight may be a contributing factor to deteriorating audit quality and plunging audit fees, 
especially in periods of economic stagnation or crisis. Such conditions may eventually incubate 
major legitimation crises for the profession. 
Building a robust system of accounting oversight in a diverse world economy is certainly a 
perplexing issue. Some of the difficulties inherent in such a project stem from the structural 
characteristics of delegative democracies and the (in)ability of individual states to effectively 
introduce externally-induced reforms. Reversing or slowing down the pace of global financial 
integration, to allow individual countries the time needed to build effective domestic institutions, 
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does not seem to be a realistic approach at the current historical juncture (Arnold, 2012). 
Furthermore, a regression to technocratic self-regulation, which entails higher risk regulatory 
capture (Hancher & Moran, 1989), has been abandoned at this point in time. Given these complex 
issues, and the fact that expertise is currently controlled by Anglo-American audit firms (Botzem, 
2012), other approaches for improving accounting oversight on a global scale warrant 
consideration. 
One such approach would be to establish local OBs as public authorities, legally enjoying political, 
economic, and administrative independence from the government. Such independent bodies, which 
are recognized as important features of contemporary policy making and reflect an increasing 
awareness of the role of institutions, aim to increase efficiency and policy credibility (Majone, 
1994, 1996). This does not mean that such bodies will, by default, solve the problems in question 
for delegative democracies. Evidence shows that clientelistic states have a long history of 
infiltrating new institutions (O’Donnell, 1994). However, such bodies, if established under a nexus 
of effective provisions for staffing and accountability to parliament regarding their operations, 
would likely have the potential to spur progress in the successful operation of oversight at the local 
level. 
Another option would be to enhance international coordination of the dispersed national OBs 
through emerging transnational structures, such as IFIAR (at the global level) and EGAOB (at the 
regional level), both of which are currently limited to an advisory and coordinating role. Currently, 
their operation, as our analysis shows, has not mitigated the problems of the Greek OB, despite the 
groundwork they have laid so far to address the structural problem in the international oversight 
system. Strengthening international coordination might even lead to some form of effective 
international (global or regional) OB (Arnold, 2012). This approach might be easier to implement in 
the case of politico-economic blocks, such as the EU, though it would require considerable co-
ordination and significant hurdles would have to be overcome. 
Further research is undoubtedly necessary to establish the generalizability of our findings and their 
relevance to other locales. Academic inquiry could shed light on the individual histories of 
accounting OBs in various national contexts, with particular emphasis on their actual performance 
and impact on the quality of financial reporting and auditing (Arnold, 2012; Malsch & Gendron, 
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2011). In addition to the delegative versus representative construct, other dimensions (e.g. code law 
vs. common law legal systems) and, more generally, historically-rooted modes of regulation (Puxty 
et al., 1987), warrant examination for their relationship to the efficacy of emerging oversight 
institutions. Another issue requiring academic attention is the position of the global profession and 
key international audit firms regarding regulatory reforms in the EU and US, and the ensuing 
spread of national OBs across the globe. Of particular interest is the provision, under Section 106 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that PCAOB conduct reviews of the foreign auditors of companies 
listed in the US; and the potential for avoiding such reviews if a local OB had already conducted 
audit quality inspections. 
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Appendix. The time line of events in the establishment of ELTE 
July 2002 The Ministry of Economy (PASOK) publishes a draft bill providing for the 
establishment of ELTE. A consultation period begins immediately and ends in March 
2003. 
March 2003 The bill for the establishment of ELTE is introduced in Parliament, having received 
only minor amendments during the consultation period. 
April 2003 The bill is initially debated in the Standing Committee of Economic Affairs in 
Parliament. The OEE secures a position on ELTE’s Executive Committee and SOEL 
secures a position on ELTE’s Administrative Council. 
May 2003 The bill is debated in the plenary session of Parliament and voted to become Law 
3148/2003. 
August 2003 The government fills: 
 The posts of ELTE’s Executive Committee: the chairman (a partner in a Big-Four 
firm), the vice-chairman – SLOT (an independent business accountant), and the 
vice-chairman – SPE (an OEE unionist affiliated with PASOK). 
 The remaining four posts in ELTE’s Administrative Council (representing two 
regulatory bodies, the auditing profession, and one business association). 
August 2003 One administrative member of staff is appointed (a receptionist-secretary to ELTE’s 
chairman). 
March 2004 PASOK loses the elections, and New Democracy takes over. 
December 2004 Law 3301/2004 is passed, bringing ELTE under closer government control and 
eliminating the representation of the profession in ELTE’s organs of administration. 
February 2005 The government: 
 Replaces the two vice-chairmen of ELTE and appoints two party affiliates, public 
servants at the Ministry of Economy. 
 Fills the four posts of SLOT (Accounting Standards Committee). 
March 2006 The government fills the six posts of SPE (Quality Inspections Committee). 
June 2007 Law 3581/2007 (article 19) significantly increases the power of the chairman of ELTE, 
while SPE is essentially abolished as a decision-making body. 
December 2007 A committee chaired by the chairman of ELTE is established to propose a law for the 
transposition of the (new) Eighth EU Directive. 
July 2008 Law 3693/2008 transfers to ELTE all regulatory and oversight power that had hitherto 
remained with SOEL. 
April 2009 A new chairman of ELTE is appointed. 
May 2009 Appointment of five audit quality inspectors by ELTE on a one-year contract. 
April 2010 The results of the first round of inspections are publicly reported. 
May 2010 The audit quality inspectors’ contracts expire; the posts remain vacant. 
May 2010 Two audit quality inspectors are appointed by SOEL and seconded to ELTE to deal 
with urgent investigations ordered by the Courts of Justice. 
January 2013 The number of audit quality inspectors appointed by SOEL and seconded to ELTE 
increases to six; as of yet, no audit quality inspections have been completed. 
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